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Introduction
In its short life, the Stability Pact has accomplished
many good things. It has reminded governments to
avoid policies that can jeopardize financial stabili-
ty. It has signaled that the euro area takes serious-
ly its commitment to a sound and stable currency.
It has given the European Commission an oppor-
tunity to remind governments that the greying of
populations implies the need to start saving more.
But it is important to recognize that the pact is now
on life support. France and Germany, the two large
countries at the heart of Europe, are both violating
its strictures. While they have made significant
progress in the direction of fiscal consolidation,
they now show signs of reform fatigue. Their
deficits having remained too close to the 3 percent
reference value during the period of expansion,
they now threaten to breach that ceiling in the cur-
rent slowdown unless governments raise taxes and
cut public spending at the worst possible macro-
economic time.
In principle, of course, the 3 percent reference
value leaves adequate room for Europe’s automat-
ic fiscal stabilizers to operate if countries keep
their deficits close to zero, or preferably in slight
surplus,in expansions.So what is the problem? It is
not only that some European governments have
not displayed the discipline needed to keep their
budgets at or close to balance during expansions; it
is that, given the structure of their budgetary
processes, there is reason to worry that they may
fail to do so again.This explains why officials con-
tinue to attach such importance to the mutual sur-
veillance of fiscal policies in expansions and also
why the 3 percent ceiling is problematic in slow-
downs.
It is no coincidence, then, that the recent flurry of
suggestions for revising the Stability Pact coincid-
ed with an economic slowdown. Proposals range
from abolishing the pact, to cyclically adjusting the
3 percent ceiling (equivalently,keying it to the con-
stant employment budget balance), to exempting
public investment, to shifting from a deficit ceiling
to a public debt ceiling. I will not say more about
abolishing the Stability Pact. Among other things,
the fact that Europe has committed to the pact
makes it difficult to abandon it in midstream with-
out sending a negative signal to the markets.
Unfortunately, existing reform proposals all have a
weakness in common with the existing pact. They
all focus on numerical reference values for debts
and deficits, whether cyclically adjusted or unad-
justed, whether inclusive or exclusive of defense
and public investment spending, whether for debts
or deficits. These numerical values are arbitrary.
They have no clear economic rationale.There is no
a priori reason to think that dire economic conse-
quences will follow if the 3 percent rule is violated
or that all will be well if the deficit comes in below
3 percent. This numerical threshold is not well
grounded in theory. Whether it implies a sustain-
able public debt depends on the real interest rate,
the real growth rate, and other variables that vary
over time – unlike the 3 percent reference value,
which is set in stone.
It is this fact – that the 3 percent ceiling is arbitrary,
capricious, and not grounded in a clear conceptual
framework – that robs it of political legitimacy and
explains why member states and their constituents
are able to resist the Commission when the latter
attempts to enforce it.They can always say “We are
a fast growing accession economy with high real
growth rates and low real interest rates; hence a
deficit in excess of 3 percent does not imply the
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same problems of debt sustainability as for other
countries.” Or “We have fewer unfunded pension
liabilities than other countries; there is therefore
no reason to be worried about this year’s 3 percent
deficit.” These and other arguments are credible.
An arbitrary 3 percent ceiling is not.
The argument, then, is that the Stability Pact as
currently configured can never be efficient and
legitimate: if enforced, it will not have the desired
effect of preventing chronic deficits without inter-
fering with the normal operation of automatic fis-
cal stabilizers and sensible discretionary fiscal poli-
cies, and consequently it is unlikely to ever garner
the political support necessary to be enforced.
Reform schemes which simply replace one set of
arbitrary numbers with another set of arbitrary
numbers will not be seen as any more legitimate or
enforceable.
An Institutional Alternative
These problems can be solved if the pact is
reformed to focus on fundamental fiscal institu-
tions rather than transitory fiscal outcomes.
Specifically,the EU should design an index of insti-
tutional reform with a point each for pension
reform, unemployment and disability insurance
reform, and revenue sharing reform. Countries
receiving three points would be exempt from the
pact’s guidelines, since there is no reason to expect
that they will be prone to chronic deficits. In con-
trast, the others, with weak institutions rendering
them susceptible to chronic deficits, would still be
subject to the pact’s warnings, sanctions, and fines.
One can imagine various objections to this proposal.
• Selective exemptions are not politically accept-
able. It might be argued that European coun-
tries will never agree to differential treatment –
to a situation where some countries are subject
to the Stability Pact while others are exempt.
However, there is a sense in which this is pre-
cisely what the Commission’s recent reform
already proposes to do – that is, to apply the
pact differentially to countries with and without
sustainability concerns.My proposal is simply to
recognize this decision and give it legitimacy by
defining clearly and precisely the criteria that
will be used in determining which countries are
exempt. This is more transparent and objective
than leaving the decision of whose debts are
“sustainable” to the discretion of the Com-
mission.
• An institutional index would be less credible. It
can be argued that an index of fiscal institutions
would be less transparent,less easily monitored,
and therefore less credible than a 3 percent ref-
erence value for the consolidated budget deficit.
The appeal of simple rules is that they are easi-
ly verified and, other things equal, easily
enforced. And what could be more simple than
a 3 percent ceiling for deficits? The problem is
that simple rules that bear little relationship to
the ultimate goals of policy are too simple.They
can be so misleading as to be unenforceable
when push comes to shove. Consider the follow-
ing analogy. Once upon a time central banks
were instructed to adopt a fixed growth of the
M1 money stock rule to guide their policy.
An unchanging 3-percent-a-year-rate-of-growth
rule for the money supply is the ultimate simple
rule, but in practice it was too simple to be effi-
cient or practicable. Central banks have there-
fore gravitated toward a more complex infla-
tion-targeting rule, where they consider the rel-
evance of a range of different variables for
observed policy outcomes. Simplicity may be a
virtue, other things equal, but other things are
not always equal.
• An index of fiscal institutions would be too diffi-
cult to calculate. In fact,economists have consid-
erable experience in constructing simple quanti-
tative measures of the relevant fiscal institutions
precisely in order to show that these are robust-
ly correlated with observed fiscal outcomes.
And the question, in any case, is whether these
institutional measures would be harder to calcu-
late than the deficit ratio that is currently the
focus of the Stability Pact. In this connection we
should not overlook the ability of governments
to fudge their fiscal accounts. Recall Italy’s bud-
get deficit in 1997, or more recent restatements
of the Portuguese public accounts. And remem-
ber that any problems that the opacity of these
countries’ accounts has created for Eurostat will
be dwarfed by problems of statistical disclosure,
coverage, timeliness and reliability in the acces-
sion economies. My institutional indices may be
disputable, in other words, but what about your
deficit figures? Are measures of the adequacy of
fiscal institutions really that much more difficult
to calculate than accurate and economically
meaningful deficit figures that include estimatesof, inter alia, unfunded future pension liabilities,
which are totally neglected by conventional
budgetary accounting? Are they really more
problematic than calculations of cyclically
adjusted deficits based on questionable esti-
mates of the output gap,or forecasts of debt sus-
tainability predicated on forecasts of growth
rates, interest rates, etc.? 
• The appropriate fiscal institutions are context
specific. What fiscal institutions help to avoid a
bias toward excessive deficits may change over
time, or they may be context specific, rendering
it a mistake to codify them. But permitting the
politicians and officials responsible for the
Stability Pact to alter the index of budgetary
institutions would open the door to lobbying
and backroom deal-making. I therefore propose
creating an independent committee of fiscal
policy experts to define the index. (It may or
may not be desirable for the members of that
committee to also rate member states’ compli-
ance; I have an open mind on this question.)
• Such a powerful independent committee would
not be politically acceptable. In fact, this com-
mittee would have much more limited powers
than the one Ricardo Hausmann, Jurgen von
Hagen and I (1999) recommended for Latin
American countries some years back, or that
suggested by Charles Wyplosz (2002) and Simon
Wren-Lewis (2000). Recall that the Eichen-
green-Hausmann-von Hagen proposal was for
an independent committee with the power to
determine the deficit, presumably with cyclical
conditions in mind,the idea being that countries
with very serious political distortions should
delegate the power to make this decision. But
political distortions are not so severe in Europe
as in Latin America; hence European countries
do not require such radical measures. Under my
proposal for reforming the Stability Pact, the
power to decide the size of the deficit would still
rest with national politicians and officials. The
committee would only decide on the criteria
determining whether or not a country was sub-
ject to the 3 percent limit. In effect, my commit-
tee would have much more limited powers than,
inter alia, the Board of the European Central
Bank.
How would such a committee be appointed? It
would be important to avoid a system where each
country appointed a member who then became an
advocate of that country’s fiscal institutions.Better
would be to emulate the Executive Board of the
ECB, which is made up of members at large who
are prohibited from taking instructions from their
national governments. Appointees should serve
reasonably long terms in office and not be eligible
for reappointment to prevent them from being par-
tial to their friends in government. Making the
Commission rather than the Council responsible
for their appointment might be considered as a
way of further loosening the link with national
governments.
Finally, there is the objection that countries would
not tolerate having a committee of the EU pre-
scribe the structure of their fiscal institutions. As
Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2002, p. 15) put it,“the
adoption of harmonized budgetary procedures
would raise fundamental problems from the point
of view of national sovereignty and might conflict
with national institutions and traditions.” But no
one is talking about harmonized institutions. My
committee would not have the power to make a
country to modify its institutions. If countries pre-
fer institutional arrangements that have proven to
be conducive to chronic deficits in other times and
places, they would be free to adopt them. They
would then be subject to the surveillance and ref-
erence values of the Stability Pact, of course, but if
they were able to keep their deficits below 3 per-
cent, contrary to the experience of other countries
with similar institutions, they would not be subject
to fines,non-interest-bearing deposits,or warnings.
And, if they kept their budgets near balance or in
surplus in normal times, there would be room for
their automatic stabilizers to operate.
While this proposal might seem radical, in fact it is
not unlike procedures already followed by com-
mercial rating agencies. The rating agencies assign
numerical ratings (or their alphabetic equivalent)
to countries on the basis of a combination of quan-
titative and qualitative inputs, including informa-
tion about the structure and efficiency of their
institutional arrangements. In other words, the rat-
ing agencies already consider institutions. They
have not found it impossible to translate informa-
tion about them into numerical indices on which
banks,pension funds and other market participants
already base economically consequential decisions.
Questions can be raised about the efficiency with
which commercial ratings predict future economic
problems,of course,but the same can be said about
the EU’s current procedures, and in particular
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about the Stability Pact’s crude numerical ceilings.
In comparison with the SGP, the procedure I pro-
pose should be more information efficient, in the
sense that it would take a broader range of eco-
nomic, financial and institutional variables into
account.
With EU enlargement, an even greater premium
will be placed on flexibility and structural reform.
As Buti, Eijffinger and Franco note, the tradeoff
between simplicity and flexibility will shift with
enlargement of the EU and its monetary union.As
the euro area is enlarged to include accession
economies with very different real interest rates
(reflecting common nominal interest rates in con-
junction with different inflation rates due to the
operation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect) and
different growth rates (reflecting the scope for
catch-up growth in the new members), the uniform
3 and 60 percent reference values will be even less
suitable to the members as a whole. To the extent
that the need for structural reform is especially
urgent in the accession economies,a reformed SGP
that focused directly on this desiderata would
become all the more desirable.
Von Hagen (1998) makes a similar point when he
observes that small countries tend to rely on
numerical limits on deficit spending while large
ones tend to rely on procedural rules. Numerical
limits are simple to administer,and in small,homo-
geneous countries that simplicity presumably
comes with few associated costs. In contrast, large
countries encompass local economies with differ-
ent economic structures that are subject to differ-
ent economic conditions;simple rules that make no
allowance for those differences tend to result in
inefficient outcomes, leading these countries to opt
for more flexible procedures that better accommo-
date the heterogeneity of their parts. The EU is a
very large, heterogeneous entity in the relevant
economic sense. Complaints that the numerically-
oriented Stability and Growth Pact has fitted its
very different members to a single fiscal strait jack-
et is a manifestation of this fact. It will become
even larger and more heterogenous in 2004.
As always,the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
The table below therefore constructs a provisional
ranking of European countries according to my
index. Column 1 denies one point to countries
whose public pension expenditures to persons over
55 years in age are projected to rise by at least
1 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010.
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal
are the problem countries.1
Column 2 gives a point to countries which use
either targets or delegation to limit the common
pool problems and deficit bias that arise from
decentralized spending decisions. The binary indi-
cators used here are drawn from Hallerberg,
Strauch and von Hagen (2001), who show that
countries that either delegate spending decisions
to a strong finance minister or use targets at the
national level to constrain spending, generally
adjust more quickly to disturbances and display
less deficit bias than countries where neither
device is used. I assign a point either when the
finance minister has significant agenda setting and
veto powers in at least three of the four stages of
the budgetary implementation process distin-
guished by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen, or
when there are formal rules requiring specific
forms of adjustment to shocks in at least three of
the four cases considered by these authors.
Column 3 gives a point to countries that have
taken significant steps to enhance labor market
flexibility by reducing hiring and firing costs and
facilitating temporary employment. It is based on
the composite indicator constructed by Nicoletti,
Who would be exempt from sanctions and fines?
(3 points indicate exemption)
Country Criterion
Limited Appropriate Adequate 
future pension fiscal insti- labor market
liabilities tutions reforms
Belgium 1 1 1
Denmark 0 0 1
Germany 1 0 0
Greece 1 1 0
Spain 1 0 0
France 0 1 0
Ireland 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 0
Luxembourg 1 1 1
Netherlands 0 0 1
Austria 1 1 1
Portugal 0 0 0
Finland 1 0 1
Sweden 1 0 1
UK 1 1 1
Source: See text.
1 Note that this list includes one country, Denmark, that European
Commission (2002) applauds for its sustainable public finances and
in particular for its explicit objective of running budget deficits
over the coming decade. There is no contradiction; the increase in
pension liabilities does not imply unsustainable finances, only that
the country cannot afford to run large budget deficits as those lia-
bilities come due, and that it should be subject to the SGP if its
deficits suddenly widen.Sarpetta and Boyland (1999) for 1998 on the basis
of 15 detailed indicators. These include measures
of the burden of procedural requirements that
must be followed in order to lay off permanent
workers, notice and severance pay requirements,
penalties for unfair dismissals,and limits on the use
of temporary contracts.Countries receive a point if
they having a rating of 2.5 or less on Nicoletti,
Scarpetta and Boyland’s 6 point scale (where high-
er values indicate more restrictions).It will be seen
that the resulting binary indicators map fairly neat-
ly into conventional understandings of which coun-
tries have done the most extensive labor market
reform.
These calculations suggest that Belgium, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Austria, and the UK would be
exempted from the numerical ceilings of the
Stability Pact under my proposal. Other member
states, in contrast, would still be subject to existing
EU procedures. In particular, the four large coun-
tries of the continent – France, Germany, Italy and
Spain – would still be subject to the warnings, non-
interest-bearing deposits and fines of the Stability
Pact, given the shortcomings of their institutional
reform programs. Some might draw from this the
conclusion that the reform I suggest here is a polit-
ical non-starter. Perhaps, but these countries are
already subject to the warnings, non-interest-bear-
ing deposits and fines of the existing pact. It is not
clear that they should be even less happy about the
institutional alternative I propose.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that Europe would be
best served by focusing on the fundamental prob-
lems for fiscal policy – public enterprises that are
too big to fail, unfunded public pension schemes
that are too big to ignore, inefficient and costly
labor market and social welfare programs, and
budget making institutions that create common
pool and free-rider problems – rather than on arbi-
trary numerical indicators like whether the budget
deficit is above or below 3 percent of GDP.So long
as Europe continues to focus on “reference values”
for fiscal policy that are only very loosely related
to the central problem of chronic budget deficits,
and that are prone to interfere with the efficient
setting of fiscal balances when chronic deficits are
not a problem, the Stability Pact will never be
regarded as legitimate; consequently, it will never
be rigorously enforced.Better would be to reorient
the pact toward the institutional weaknesses that
in fact create the danger of chronic deficits and
that should be the focus of policy makers’ concern.
By now, the double meaning of my title should be
clear. Not only are institutions important for fiscal
stability, but, in addition, institutions should be the
focus of the revised Stability Pact.
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THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT:
AN ASSET RATHER THAN A LIABILITY
Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a central
component of the macroeconomic policy frame-
work of the European Union. Since last year, the
Pact has been severely tested as a number of
European countries have been facing difficulties in
complying with its rules during the economic slow-
down. Partly because of these developments, the
Pact has been subject to strong criticism from some
policy-makers, academics and commentators.
According to its critics, the Pact is unnecessarily
rigid, especially during times of economic down-
turn, and limits the ability of fiscal authorities to
stabilise aggregate demand and/or to finance struc-
tural reforms and public investment to expand
aggregate supply. In other words, the Pact is
accused of »choking« economic growth in Europe
at a time when fiscal policy is actively employed to
support economic activity and long-term growth in
the United States. Some of the critics renewed ear-
lier calls to abolish the Pact.Others,who accept the
usefulness of the Pact, focused their criticism on
certain features and implementation modalities,
and proposed a more flexible and prudent inter-
pretation of the Pact and application of its rules.A
general point that is made, linked to the previous
arguments, is that the credibility of the Pact is
undermined by the fact that some of the larger EU
Member States, which should be the engines of
economic growth in Europe, are currently facing
severe policy constraints as a result of the Pact’s
rules.
Reacting to the fiscal strains and associated criti-
cisms, the European Commission made proposals
in November 2002, which were aimed at strength-
ening the co-ordination of budgetary policies. In
March 2003, the European Council endorsed a
report which had been adopted earlier by the
ECOFIN Council in response to the Commission’s
proposals.
In this presentation, I will address some of the crit-
icisms levelled against the Pact and try to assess its
effectiveness in contributing to the attainment of
the Union’s economic policy objectives, also in the
light of the recently endorsed report by the EU
Council. I will focus on three questions that are
pivotal for assessing the usefulness and effective-
ness of the Pact. First, are the fiscal rules of the
Pact necessary to secure sound and sustainable
public finances in the European Union? Second, if
the answer is positive, as I believe it should be, are
the specific parameters of the Pact’s policy frame-
work appropriate and its implementation proce-
dures and enforcement mechanisms effective for
achieving its objectives? Finally, does the Pact
impair the ability of Member States to conduct
effectively fiscal stabilisation policy? As the over-
all theme of this Munich Economic Summit is to
assess to which extent the European economy can
match the United States, I will draw some parallels
between the Stability and Growth Pact and fiscal
rules at the state level in the United States, fully
acknowledging the caveats of such a comparison.
Does the European Union need fiscal rules?
Let me start by addressing the question whether
the European Union, and in particular the euro
area, needs fiscal rules. Most economists and poli-
cy makers agree that fiscal discipline and sound
public finances are conducive to sustainable eco-
nomic growth and social welfare. Sound public
finances contribute to maintaining a stable macro-
economic environment, allowing all economic
actors to take decisions, be it consumption or
investment decisions, without being hindered by
distortions in the functioning of the economy,
caused by the threat of tax increases or ad hoc fis-
cal measures, crowding out of private investments
or relatively high real interest rates, which might
all be the consequences of unsustainable fiscalpolicies. Moreover, as a central banker, I can, of
course, not neglect the importance of fiscal disci-
pline for maintaining price stability over the medi-
um and longer run. For instance, large fiscal
deficits can adversely affect inflation through an
undue increase in demand or the need to correct
these deficits by means of tax increases, thereby
complicating the task of central banks aiming for
price stability. More recently, the need for fiscal
consolidation and sound public finances has
become intrinsically linked to demographic devel-
opments and their implications for the non-funded
liabilities of pension systems. The ageing of the
population, which is expected to reach its peak in
the middle of this century, will ceteris paribus
imply a substantial increase in public expenditures
for health care, pensions and social security. There
is some evidence that the impact of the ageing of
the population is, already now, felt by a number of
countries, both in and outside Europe.
Economists do not agree on how to precisely
define and make “operational” the concept of fis-
cal discipline. The Stability and Growth Pact
defines fiscal discipline as the obligation to pursue
– over the medium term – a balanced budget or a
surplus. It cannot be derived from economic theo-
ry that countries should always pursue a balanced
budget (and this is not exactly what the Pact pre-
scribes). However, from a political-economy point
of view, such a rule seems to make sense, as it pro-
vides a credible anchor for fiscal policy makers.
There is also less unanimity among economists and
policy makers whether imposing fiscal rules on pol-
icy makers is necessary for ensuring sound public
finances. Some claim that governments running
unsustainable public deficits or debts will be forced
by financial markets to adjust their policies, as
markets eventually will no longer be willing to
finance these deficits and debts. However, experi-
ence has shown that financial markets are not
always the best judge of fiscal authorities’ abilities
to ensure fiscal discipline. Markets, more often
than we would expect, react too little or too late to
imprudent and unsustainable fiscal policies, allow-
ing the gradual build-up of large imbalances, the
correction of which is often abrupt and painful,
both in economic and social terms. Hence, there
are arguments supported by evidence that a set of
fiscal rules may be necessary to ensure fiscal disci-
pline, at least in some countries where budgetary
institutions are inadequate and where short-term
political considerations tend to outweigh long-
term budgetary objectives.
In the context of a monetary union, such as the
euro area, the adoption of fiscal rules becomes
indispensable. In a monetary union, the spillovers
from unsustainable fiscal policies from one mem-
ber of the union to another are potentially much
larger than in an environment of flexible or
adjustable exchange rates.To conclude, fiscal disci-
pline is beneficial for the European Union and the
euro area. To ensure such discipline in the Union,
where the responsibility for the conduct of fiscal
policy is decentralised, requires the imposition of a
set of rules.
Is the Stability and Growth Pact framework
appropriately specified?
This automatically leads me to the second issue I
should like to address, i.e. the extent to which the
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact is ade-
quately specified. Indeed, as I have already
referred to, it is important to distinguish between
the objectives and underlying principles of the
Stability and Growth Pact, being the maintenance
of sound public finances – in particular running
balanced budgets or surpluses in the medium term
– and the parameters and modalities of the Pact,
that is the set of rules and implementation proce-
dures that aim to ensure the achievement of its
objectives. Indeed, some critics, who accept the
usefulness of the Pact but regard it as too rigid,
have argued that the Pact would require greater
parametric variability.At the moment,the rules are
identical for all countries, although circumstances,
such as economic structures, the size of the public
debt and the potential fall-out of demographic
developments on public finances, differ.
It is not possible to discuss in detail the substantive
arguments supporting these views, which are part-
ly based on economic reasoning and partly reflect
political considerations. The European Commis-
sion’s proposals communicated last November to
some extent tried to respond to these views. The
aim of the Commission’s Communication was to
improve the implementation of the Pact, fully
respecting its fundamental principles and without
changing its key parameters. For example, it was
proposed and endorsed by the EU Council to place
more emphasis on the public debt ratios and the
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pace of debt reduction in the budgetary surveil-
lance process. In addition, the possibility of allow-
ing small deviations from the close to balance
requirement was explored for countries with debt
ratios well below 60 percent of GDP. This option
was not endorsed so as to avoid introducing new
rules which could complicate the rules and the
implementation procedures of the Pact, but it was
accepted that the assessment of the fulfilment of
the balanced budget requirement would take into
account “country-specific circumstances”. On the
whole, it has been confirmed that the key parame-
ters of the Pact and its implementation procedures,
as recently agreed in the EU Council report, are
appropriate and adequate. I should like to stress
that it is not advisable to alter or, in particular, to
weaken “the rules of the game”, when the partici-
pants have just started playing it.The credibility of
any set of rules – and thereby their effectiveness –
is also measured against the willingness of the
players of the game to adhere to the rules, also in
times when changing or weakening the rules would
offer, at least in a short-term perspective, an easier
way out.
Although I cannot enter into a detailed discussion
about the parameters of the Pact, it is at this stage
that I should like to draw some parallels between
the fiscal rules in Europe and the fiscal rules at the
state level in the United States. Indeed, most states
have introduced balanced-budget or other rules in
order to ensure fiscal discipline, some of them dat-
ing back to the 19th century as part of these states’
constitutions. As I have already mentioned, such a
comparison suffers from many caveats and the
conclusions should be treated with caution. First,
the fiscal-federalist framework in the United
States is different from the framework in the
European Union and the euro area. If one would
compare the states in the US with the Member
States of the European Union, and the US federal
government with the authorities at the EU level,
US state expenditures amount to almost 10 percent
of US GNP, while the federal expenditures amount
to approximately 25 percent; EU “federal” expen-
ditures are not even 2 percent of EU GDP.
Moreover,the functions of US states and hence the
corresponding fiscal instruments are different from
the functions and fiscal framework of EU Member
States, the most important difference being that
EU Member States are responsible for the stabili-
sation function of the budget, whereas this is clear-
ly a federal responsibility in the United States.
Having said this, I should point out that attempts
have been made in the economic literature to assess
the effectiveness of the fiscal rules at the US state
level, most of which – as I said – have been in exis-
tence much longer than similar rules in the
European Union, and, on the basis of this experi-
ence, to draw conclusions for the functioning of the
Stability and Growth Pact. According to this litera-
ture, the most effective fiscal rules at the US state
level have a number of characteristics. First, the
accounting framework underlying the rules should
be defined ex post and not ex ante; in other words,
compliance with the rules should be assessed on the
basis of actual fiscal outcomes, and not planned or
budgeted fiscal data. Second, it should not be possi-
ble to override or temporarily suspend fiscal rules.
Third, the enforcement of the fiscal rules should be
the responsibility of an open, politically indepen-
dent, and non-partisan review panel.When the rules
are violated, sanctions should be significant to cor-
rect the behaviour of fiscal authorities. Finally,
amending the fiscal rules should be difficult.
A comparison of the rules and procedures of the
Stability and Growth Pact with these characteris-
tics shows that the European fiscal rules perform
reasonably well, which may lead us to conclude
that they are – in principle – suited to ensure fiscal
discipline. Or, in line with the theme of today’s
conference,the European fiscal rules match the US
fiscal rules rather well. The accounting framework
of the Pact is of an ex post nature, the parameters
of the fiscal rules cannot be set aside or amended
easily and the sanctions in the case of breaching
the rules are significant. The weakest part of the
European fiscal rules is their enforceability, as the
final judges, who are to assess compliance with the
rules,are also the ones who eventually can alter the
rules, and are subject to the rules. In other words,
the situation is similar to that of a potential alco-
holic who has been given the key to the mini bar.
The latter observation might indeed warrant a
greater and stronger role for the European
Commission in the implementation procedures of
the Stability and Growth Pact, as an independent,
non-partisan assessor of the fiscal situation of EU
Member States. Indeed, the ECB supports the pro-
posals from the European Commission to strength-
en the latter’s role in the context of the Stability
and Growth Pact.
To conclude, I answer the second question – to
which extent is the Stability and Growth Pactframework adequate? – in the affirmative as well.
First, experience with fiscal rules at the US state
level shows that the European fiscal framework’s
parameters and modalities should, at least in prin-
ciple, ensure sound public finances. Second, the
specification of the Pact’s rules and procedures is
sufficiently flexible as I will argue later on.
Moreover, and given the previous assessment, one
should not change, or in any case not weaken, the
rules when the game has just begun, because some
participants are facing problems.
Does the Stability and Growth Pact limit the 
conduct of fiscal policy?
I will now turn to the last question I should like to
address. Does the Stability and Growth Pact
impose unacceptable constraints on the stabilisa-
tion function of fiscal policy? In my view, it does
not. Let me explain. I should first recall a major
feature of the Stability and Growth Pact which
clearly shows that it allows for a combination of
rules – ensuring fiscal discipline – and room for
(automatic) fiscal stabilisation. The Pact obliges
countries to pursue a balanced budget or a surplus
over the medium term, meaning that the actual
deficit may deviate from the medium-term target,
depending on business cycle fluctuations. In peri-
ods of weak or (small) negative economic growth,
the deficit is allowed to increase, but not to exceed
the threshold of 3 percent of GDP; in periods of
economic growth above potential growth, most
countries should run fiscal surpluses. Empirical
evidence shows that in the European context a
margin of 3 percentage points of GDP is, under
normal circumstances, adequate to let automatic
stabilisers be fully operational, thereby stabilising
business cycle fluctuations. In other words, coun-
tries that comply with the rules of the game should
have ample opportunity for (automatic) fiscal sta-
bilisation. The fact that some countries are cur-
rently forced to pursue more or less a pro-cyclical
fiscal policy, in order to avoid breaching the 3 per-
cent threshold, should hence not be regarded as a
failure of the Pact but as a failure of these coun-
tries to sufficiently reduce their budget deficits in
periods of stronger economic growth. Indeed,
whereas some countries are struggling to keep
their fiscal house in order,most countries that have
complied with the “rules of the game”are to a less-
er extent confronted with the need to adjust fiscal
policies and are able to tolerate an increase in the
budget deficit.
A second,more general point I should like to make
in this context is the extent to which fiscal policy
can effectively be used for stabilisation purposes.
Indeed, the experiences of many countries, in par-
ticular in the 1970s and 1980s, have shown that
active counter-cyclical fiscal policies are not very
effective.First,the lead-times between taking fiscal
measures and their actual impact on the economy
are considerable. Moreover, the timing of such
measures is always uncertain and depends on fore-
casts of future economic developments. Finally, if
economic actors anticipate a fiscal stimulus, the
impact of such stimulus in terms of increased
demand might be small, as economic actors may
increase their savings in reaction to the expansion-
ary fiscal policies. In other words, economic actors
may have the tendency to free-ride on govern-
ments’ counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The latter
argument may also apply to the working of auto-
matic stabilisers, if anticipated by economic actors.
Hence, fiscal policy is increasingly regarded as part
of the set of structural policies a government avails
itself. In this context, fiscal policy should first and
foremost be directed at improving the functioning
of economic mechanisms and markets.
Conclusions
I would now like to sum up some of the main
points I have made so far and discuss briefly how
to best address fiscal policy challenges in the
Union. I believe that the arguments I have put for-
ward and the empirical evidence strongly support
the view that the Stability and Growth Pact is not
a liability, but an asset of the European macroeco-
nomic policy framework. The fiscal rules, as laid
down in the Treaty and later elaborated in the SGP,
have greatly contributed to fiscal discipline in the
EU, both in the run-up to EMU as well as there-
after. Indeed, I am certain that some Member
States, in particular those with a less convincing
track record, would not have been able to bring
their fiscal house in order, without the existence of
the European fiscal framework.
Nevertheless, the Pact is currently put to the test,
as several countries are increasingly facing difficul-
ties in complying with the “rules of the game”.The
causes of these difficulties have been unfavorable
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fiscal positions, the failure to consolidate public
finances during periods of strong economic
growth, the adverse effects of the economic slow-
down and, in some cases, the relaxation of fiscal
policies. These causes can certainly not be attrib-
uted to the SGP framework.At the same time, the
present situation reveals that the SGP rules and
procedures have not been sufficiently effective in
preventing the occurrence of excessive deficits in
some countries. Since the fundamental principles
underlying the Pact are sound and its basic fea-
tures are appropriate, the reaction to these devel-
opments should not be to change – that is relax –
the basic “rules of the game”, especially when the
game has just begun. The appropriate response is
to implement the rules in an effective and prag-
matic way, taking advantage of the flexibility pro-
vided by the rules, but in a prudent manner.
The SGP offers sufficient flexibility to weather the
effects of economic downturns and to provide
room for fiscal stabilisation policies. First, auto-
matic stabilisers can operate fully, after fiscal posi-
tions “close to balance or in surplus” have been
reached. Second, SGP implementation procedures
permit a higher degree of flexibility and more
scope for discretion in the application of rules than
is generally realised. Third, the approach to the
assessment of Member States’ fiscal positions, as
specified in the code of conduct concerning the
evaluation of stability and convergence pro-
grammes,also leaves some room for interpretation.
Finally, the conclusions reached by the European
Council regarding SGP rules and procedures
include elements that are expected to enhance the
effectiveness of the Pact, while providing scope for
discretion in assessing its implementation, for
instance by taking into account “country-specific
circumstances”. It is essential that greater flexibili-
ty and pragmatism in the implementation of the
SGP must not lead to the relaxation of the rules,
thereby undermining the Pact’s credibility.
Looking forward,there are four conditions or poli-
cies that are necessary for addressing the present
fiscal challenges and enhancing the credibility of
the SGP. First, strengthening the rules, in the sense
that more incentives – positive or negative – are
created to prevent breaching the rules and ensure
that countries adhere to them. Enhancing the role
of the European Commission in the implementa-
tion procedures and increasing peer pressure in the
Council would contribute to this end. Second,
improving the monitoring of budgetary develop-
ments based on rigorous accounting rules and the
timely provision of data. Third, implementing
structural reforms,so as to improve fiscal positions,
both by increasing potential growth and by reform-
ing pension systems and fiscal institutions. Finally
and crucially, Member States with fiscal imbal-
ances must pursue their fiscal consolidation strate-
gies in a determined and systematic way in accor-
dance with their commitments, which should be
based on realistic assumptions about economic
prospects. In the final analysis, sound and sustain-
able public finances can be achieved only if their
importance for securing growth and price stability
over the long term is better understood and recog-
nised. Furthermore, the usefulness and effective-
ness of the SGP will be enhanced if it is seen as a
framework that can foster the attainment of these
objectives rather than as a straitjacket which arbi-
trarily constrains fiscal policy, without reason or
cause.